Strongly secure certificateless one-pass authenticated key agreement scheme

Authors

  • BAOJUN HUANG School of Mathematics and Statistics, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, China
  • HANG TU School of Computer, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, China

Keywords:

Authenticated key agreement, certificateless cryptography, eCK model, one-pass, provable security.

Abstract

As certificateless public key cryptography (CLPKC) could solve the problem of keyescrow, recently it has been studied more and more. Certificateless authenticated keyagreement (CLAKA), as an important part of the CLPKC, also attracts considerableattention. So far, many kinds of provably secure one-pass CLAKA schemes have beenproposed. However, only few of them are given security proof in a formal model.In this paper, we propose a novel one-pass CLAKA scheme and demonstrate that itis provably secure under the gap bilinear computational Diffie-Hellman (GBCDH)assumption and the Gap Computational Diffie-Hellman (GCDH) assumption in theextended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. And as far as we know, our scheme is thefirst provably secure CLAKA scheme in the eCK model.

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Published

04-02-2015